Predicting Political Revolution by Hart, Douglass Fraser
University of North Dakota
UND Scholarly Commons




Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hart, Douglass Fraser, "Predicting Political Revolution" (2013). Theses and Dissertations. 1431.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/1431
PREDICTING POLITICAL REVOLUTION 
by 
Douglass F. Hart 




Submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
of the 
University of North Dakota 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Science in Applied Economics 
 







This thesis, submitted by Douglass Hart in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Applied Economics from the University of North Dakota, has 
been read by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done, 




Dr. Cullen Goenner 
 
_______________________________________ 
Dr. Pradosh Simlai 
 
_______________________________________ 








This thesis is being submitted by the appointed advisory committee as having 
met all of the requirements of the Graduate School at the University of North Dakota 















Title   Predicting Political Revolution 
 
Department  Department of Economics 
 
Degree  Masters of Science in Applied Economics 
 
 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate degree 
from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the library of this University shall make 
it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying 
for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my thesis work 
or, in his absence, by the Chairperson of the department or the dean of the Graduate 
School. It is understood that any copying or publication or other use of this thesis or part 
thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also 
understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of North 











TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST  TABLES ............................................................................................................... V 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................ VI 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. VII 
CHAPTER 
          I INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1 
          II DATA ............................................................................................................... 8 
          III METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 12 
          IV ANALYSIS OF RESULTS ................................................................................... 19 
               MODELING IN-PERIOD .............................................................................................. 19 
               MODELING FUTURE EVENTS ...................................................................................... 28 
          V CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 38 
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................. 40 









LIST OF TABLES 
Table                                                                                                                                          Page 
1: Logistic Regression on Occurences of Revolution, Guerrilla War Onset or State 
Collapse…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……..….20 
 
2: Logistic Regression on Occurences of Revolt, Guerrilla War Onset or State  
Collapse With The Addition of Polity Dumies…………………………………….…..…………………..24 
 
3: Logistic Regression Results on Three Versions of Dependent Variable…….…..………..26 
4: Logistic Regression on Occurences of Revolt, Guerrilla War Onset or State  
Collapse With Two Year Lead……………………………………………………………………..……..……….30 
 
5: Risk Level Classifications……………………………………………………………………………..…....…..35 
6: Select 2011 Nations With Predicted Risk Levels........................................................36 
7: Logistic Regression on Occurences of Revolt, Guerrilla War Onset or State  
Collapse With Two Year Lead And Inclusion of Factionalism Variable..........................41 
 









I wish to express my thanks to the staff of the economics department at UND, 
particularly the members of my graduate committee for their help and guidance and to 


































My thesis study examines the economic and sociological factors associated with political 
revolutions in order to create a predictive model. I do this by using statistical methods 
with nation level panel data collected from public domain sources. I anticipate being 
able to create a predictive model that provides a probability forecast of a country 















Political revolution is an event wherein a nation’s people rise up and attempt to 
overthrow the ruling power and replace the current governing power with another. The 
occurrence of revolutions dates back almost as far as organized government does, and 
with over two hundred different national governments in power today, it is unavoidable 
that this phenomenon will continue to take place around the globe.  
These events can have far reaching effects in varying degrees around the world; 
a revolution affects not only the revolting nation but also its neighboring states and 
trading partners. Neighboring countries may feel the effects, or even be drawn into the 
middle, of violent civil wars as revolutionaries seek refuge across national borders or 
attempt to move weapons and recruit soldiers into their own state.  Attempts could be 
made to loot resources across national borders in order to finance expensive guerrilla 
wars. A nation that trades with a revolting country can be affected by a revolt in a 
number of adverse ways.  A nation that exports goods to a revolting country may find 
that the new government after a revolt does not honor the contracts made by the pre-
revolutionary authorities and will no longer pay for the traded goods. In the case of a 
nation that imports from a revolting nation, disruptions in production in the revolting 
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nation due to the revolt, or revolutionary forces taking control of a nation’s ports in 
order to gain a foothold on the current regime, would cause a revolting nation to cease 
the export of goods that a trading partner may rely on. These goods can include exports 
such as foodstuffs or intermediary goods in a foreign countries’ manufacturing process. 
A disruption of this type in the supply chain would force businesses to form rushed 
contracts with new suppliers and completely rebuild supply chains or fail to meet 
contracts with end users which could have devastating results with other trading 
partners.  
Not only are imported and exported goods at risk, but also capital and financial 
assets. Foreign direct investment can be seized entirely under volatile conditions. This 
means that businesses that set up plants in foreign countries could lose millions in 
capital and suffer severely reduced production capacity. Just as with payment for goods, 
a new regime may choose not to recognize the national debt accrued by the previous 
regime, leaving holders of government issued bonds with nothing. Stock prices of 
companies that operate within the revolting nation could plummet as upheaval disrupts 
manufacturing and other business processes vital to publicly traded firms.  
A change in the ruling power of a nation can have big implications politically as 
well as economically. Regime changes due to coup d’états and guerrilla uprisings can 
bring quick and unexpected ends to political alliances. A former allied state could even 
turn into a potentially hostile power, drastically changing the political landscape of an 
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entire region. In the interconnected global economy that we live in today a revolt in a 
single nation can have effects on the entire world to varying degrees. 
A better study of the causes and correlates of revolutions will help us predict the 
onset of these chaotic and often times violent events, providing the opportunity to take 
action in a number of ways. With proper warning of the oncoming of a revolt a trading 
nation could take efforts to minimize the impact of a potential disruption in trade flows; 
alternate trade routes or supply chains could be sought out before they are immediately 
needed. Investors would be made aware of this unique risk in making investment 
decisions. Proper warning of revolts would benefit policy makers as well. The efforts of 
more powerful nations or even the U.N. could include an attempt to prevent a 
revolution from occurring in allied nations by addressing signs of political 
fractionalization with negotiation, or attempting to affect the outcome of a civil war. 
Fair warning of these events would allow foreign policy makers and investors alike a 
myriad of options in the face of an upcoming crisis event beyond simply reacting after 
the fact.  
The objective of this paper is to develop a model to predict the likelihood of a 
nation undergoing a political revolution using both social and economic factors. This 
paper will not to explain all of the direct causes of a revolution, as these can be 
widespread and difficult to isolate. Rather, the purpose of this study is to utilize current 
theory pertaining to the wider causes of revolution and build upon it in order to be able 
to predict their occurrence in a more broad sense than would be possible if based on 
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specific causes in a case by case fashion. This is accomplished by using econometric 
techniques on data compiled from previously gathered sources. From these sources 
variables are used first based on previous studies, and then new variables are tested, 
mostly economic, in an attempt to locate new potential indicators, and incorporate 
them into a model that would be able to predict the onset of revolts and similar events.  
In the construction of any economic model it helps to examine prior evidence or 
literature on the subject in order to build a preliminary framework for the model. I look 
at literature focusing on the causes of revolts, civil wars, and state collapses as the onset 
of all of these events are of interest in this study, with an emphasis on the first two. 
Several papers whose subject is the onsets of civil wars are Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
and Collier and Hoeffler (2004). These papers focus on a rebel forces ability to obtain 
the natural resources necessary to finance a revolutionary movement through the 
practice of looting. Around the same time another paper was published by Fearon and 
Laitin (2003), which looked not at a rebelling force’s ability to utilize natural resource 
allocations for financial reasons, but their ability to take advantage of non-material 
resources. This was done by weighing a national government’s ability to finance the 
creation and maintenance of an army with the ability of rebel forces to take advantage 
of such factors as geographic terrain, population sizes, and political instability. In the 
same vain as these studies is an econometric study done by Smith (2004), which studies 
a nation’s abundance of oil resources and the utilization of these resources to create 
wealth as a determinant of a political regime’s survival. This study concludes that the 
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presence of oil wealth correlates with higher longevity in political regimes, which 
supports the argument made by Fearon and Laitin (2003) that a state’s ability to finance 
a strong military is a factor that weighs in on the onset of civil wars.  
The second theoretical point of view that is the focus in many of the studies 
previously done on the topic of revolution is that of political structures, which is 
mentioned by Fearon and Laitin (2003) when they propose that political instability is 
one of the resources that insurgents can take advantage of in the ignition of civil wars. 
This line of inquiry is further pursued by Bates (2008) and Goldstone (1991). The 
underlying assertion made in these texts is that many nations may have potential anti-
state factions with varying degrees of resources, and the assumption is made that any 
state that is politically stable and united will be able to defeat an unequally funded rebel 
movement. Therefore this would imply that the best way to predict the occurrence of 
political revolution would be to look for cases wherein there is political fractionalization 
already present. In line with this theory is an econometric study by Goldstone et al. 
(2010), which primarily uses five categorical measures of political polity as independent 
variables for forecasting adverse political events, ranging from revolts to ethnic wars. 
This study is particularly noteworthy in that the goal of their research falls in line with 
the goal of this study, that being to develop an empirical model for forecasting the 
probability of an adverse event occurring. The primary difference between the study 
done by Goldstone et al. (2010) and this one is that the events in question are more 
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narrowly defined in my study to those that specifically relate to the usurping of a 
governing body. 
Another article, Gariorowski (1995), analyzes specific occurrences of revolutions 
in third world countries, and proposes that economic shocks, either via abnormally high 
inflation rates or recession, can be a significant factor in the process leading to a 
revolution. It is this idea, that adverse economic conditions can help to bring on a revolt, 
that I look to incorporate into the more current theory involving political structures. 
Specifically I look to expand upon the theory revolving around political instability as a 
cause of revolution by proposing that political instability can be fostered or magnified by 
adverse economic conditions, and that therefore economic stagnation and decline can 
be a precursor to political revolution in such instances wherein there is already some 
level of instability present. If there is some amount of fractionalization present within a 
political system in addition to the other factors needed, as proposed by Fearon and 
Laitin (2003), then the addition of political pressure and disagreement brought on in a 
state of economic decline can magnify the inherent weaknesses in a political system. A 
period of economic hardship could also be viewed as a sign of weakness to potential 
rebel forces and thus signal an opportunity to attempt a forced change in power, and 
limit a regime’s ability to fund a strong military counter effort. 
 In order to test this theory I first establish that economic variables are significant 
in the prediction of revolution within the presence of other socioeconomic factors which 
have been shown to correlate with revolution onset by past studies. I then establish that 
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a lack of economic growth is significant within this framework, and then that these 
variables retain their significance in the presence of the measures of political instability 
used by Goldstone et al. (2010). Upon finding these results to be significant I then adapt 
the model to take the form of a forward looking model in order to predict the 
probability of the onset of revolution with a two year lead time. I do this by using a two-
period lead of the original dependent variable of political upheaval as my new 
dependent variable. I find that my two-year lead model not only correctly predicts the 
incidence of revolution with over 75% accuracy within sample, but that the model 
retains its predictive capacity when used out of sample. Finally I develop a categorical 






For the creation and testing of this model I use yearly data from 1960 to 2000 
from over two hundred different nations. This provides a window of over eight 
thousand potential observations to work with. I am interested in studying the 
occurrence of several distinct yet similar events which include all out revolt by a 
populace, the onset of a guerrilla war whose aim is to overthrow the current regime, 
state collapse, and the incidence of military coup d’états. Therefore, I group together 
the events of most relevance to create my dependent variable. As such the dependent 
variable can be defined in a number of different ways depending on which of these 
events I choose for my definition of revolt to encapsulate. Rather than arbitrarily picking 
a selection of these factors and ignoring how my model performs on any other 
definition I test several iterations of my dependent variable in order to ascertain 
whether or not my model is robust to the decision of how narrowly the term revolt is 
defined. I also do not simply use all of these terms as I am concerned that the causes 
that bring about events such as military coups and state collapse may be different than 
those that bring about revolts or guerrilla wars. The dependent variable in my study is a 
binary variable that takes a one value in country-years wherein the events of interest 
9 
 
occur. The narrowest definition that I test takes on a one only in the case of an 
attempted revolt. The second form of dependent variable takes on a one value in 
country-years wherein there is either a revolt attempt, the start of a guerrilla war, or a 
state collapse. The third and broadest form of dependent variable takes on a one value 
in country-years wherein there is any one of a revolt attempt, guerrilla war onset, state 
collapse, or coup. Lastly, once I am satisfied with the specification of my model I also 
create a forward looking form of my dependent variable in order to forecast into the 
future. In doing this I take the dependent variable as defined by the incidence of revolt 
attempt, guerrilla war outbreak, or state collapse and create a variable that is a two 
period lead of this. The new dependent variable takes on a one value in country years 
wherein there will be an incidence of one of the previously listed events two years later.  
Next I turn to the independent variables to be included in my model. In building 
the framework for my model I look to the Goldstone et al. (2010) and the Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) models to use as a base. Specifically I first attempt to model conditions that 
would indicate that a rebel force could attain enough of an advantage to attempt to 
overthrow a state. To this end I include from the Fearon and Laitin (2003) model a 
measure of population. Rather than use population size as done by Goldstone et al. 
(2010), I use the percentage of a population that is located in urban areas as suggested 
by Fearon and Laitin (2002). I have not included a dummy for mountainous regions as 
per Fearon and Laitin (2003) for two reasons; Goldstone et al. (2010) found this variable 
to be insignificant, and also because of a lack of sufficient data. I include a variable 
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measuring oil rents as a percentage of a nation’s GDP as per Smith, (2004) and in order 
to have a measure of a nation’s abundance of resources. I also test data pertaining to 
mineral resource rents, coal rents, and total rents from natural resources. This is done in 
order to control for a state’s ability to finance a military large enough to deter a guerilla 
effort. Goldstone et al. (2010), in addition to focusing on political structures, found that 
the infant mortality rate to be very significant, and because of this I include a measure 
of the infant mortality rate in my model as well, as both Goldstone et al. (2010) and this 
study have the same goal of forecasting events associated with regime changes. I have 
also recreated the Goldstone et al. (2010) five measurements of polity, ranging from 
fully democratic to fully autocratic. I choose to use these variables rather than some of 
the other more traditional variables measuring political polity found in the Polity IV 
dataset because Goldstone et al. (2010) reported that their five variables achieved a 
much better fit for the data and outperformed the other variables in predicting accurate 
outcomes. I test variables measuring a nation’s ethnic and religious diversification, as 
well as several measures of income inequality, as these have been used in both 
Goldstone et al. (2010) and Fearon and Laitin (2003). I use several variables in order to 
measure a nation’s economic performance and growth. The first of these is a nation’s 
trade level, measured as a percentage of GDP. The second variable is the growth rate of 
a nation’s gross domestic product. This is the economic variable of most interest as GDP 
is a good indicator of the size of an economy and the change in this size from one year 
to the next tells us what the economy is doing. Thirdly I also test data pertaining to 
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educational attainment. My goal with this is to account for the amount of human capital 
in a nation to and use this measurement as a proxy for research and development. This 
is an indicator of technological growth that I use as another measure of a nation’s 
growth in addition to GDP according to endogenous  growth theory as outlined by 
Romer (2006). I choose to use a proxy here not because of exogeneity issues but 
because of a lack of viable data on more common measures of research and 
development growth. I also test a dummy variable for previous cases of instability in 
recent years, which takes into account revolt attempts, active guerrilla wars, state 
collapses or coups within any of the five years prior to the measurement year. This is 
not motivated by previous literature so much as it is a measure taken to account for any 
trend that may occur of periods of instability. As the ultimate goal of this study is the 
production of a forecast model, the inclusion of a variable to account for trend is an 
appropriate measure.  
 In building my model I obtain econometric data from several different sources. 
The first is a webpage titled “The Logic of Political Survival Data Source” which provides 
supplementary data to a book of the same title written by the authors of the site. This 
dataset is a compilation of data from several other sources, including Polity IV from the 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, Banks’ Cross National 
Time Series Data Archive, the World Bank, COW, or Correlates of War, as well as several 
articles. I also collect additional data from the World Bank Database and integrate this 
into the other dataset. The finalized dataset consists of panel data which spans over two 
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hundred nations which make up the panel groups. Because the World Bank Database 
only has data going back as far as 1960, the working sample is limited to data pertaining 
to between 1960 and 2000, and is organized annually. One drawback of using a 
previously compiled dataset is that it does not allow me to easily update the data within 
this dataset, as this would involve tracking down all of the original sources and counting 
on all of them to have been updated, because of this limitation I am restricted to using 






 Throughout this paper and unless otherwise stated I choose to use the definition 
of my dependent variable that indicates the onset of a revolt attempt, the start of a 
guerrilla war aimed at the overthrow of the current political state, or a collapse of 
central authority. I choose to use this grouping of events on which to focus as opposed 
to the other possible combinations because these events will in most cases have a 
similar effect upon the nation itself and other nations with ties to it, whether those ties 
be political or economic. I do not include the onset of coups as the factors that cause 
this event may be different from the causes of the other events in question, and also 
because the effects of a coup can be widely different. If those who perform a coup have 
enough power and influence within the country and military, which is a factor that may 
be associated with coup attempts, they may be able to affect a successful enough 
change in authority so as to avoid many of the adverse effects that would ensue after 
the events that I do focus on. Upon building and testing my model I find that such 
variables as urban population percentage, infant mortality rates, and previous instability 
to be significant. I initially find oil rents to be somewhat significant, but find that this 
variable is not robust to the inclusion of other factors in my model such as education 
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and previous instability and therefore drop it from my working model. I also find trade 
as a percentage of GDP and GDP growth to be very statistically significant. Upon 
verifying that GDP growth is significant I then create two new variables to more 
specifically measure this relationship. The first is a dummy variable that takes on a value 
of one in country years where GDP growth is negative, marking an economic contraction 
from the previous year. I then create an interaction term between the GDP growth 
dummy and GDP growth. This conditional GPD growth variable measures GDP growth 
only in instances when it is negative. The purpose of these new measurements is to 
isolate specifically instances of economic decline and determine their magnitude. Of 
these variables I choose to use the conditional GDP growth variable in my working 
model over either GDP growth on its own or a combination of GDP growth and the 
negative growth dummy. I do this as both the Akaike information criterion and Bayesian 
information criterion report this as being the best specified form of the model.  
 Next I test the inclusion of my female education variable. In order to measure 
education levels I use the percentage of pupils enrolled in secondary education who are 
female. I use this variable because it is more widely available than tertiary education 
variables and proves to be a better model fit by the Akaike and Bayesian information 
criterions than measures of tertiary education enrollment. However, there is a concern 
that this variable measures not only education but civil liberties as some regions allow 
more freedoms to women than others and this could affect this statistic. Therefore I 
introduce a civil liberties index as a variable to control for this effect.  I find the 
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percentage of secondary students who are female to be statistically significant as well as 
the civil liberties index. The inclusion of the civil liberties index does not affect the 
significance or reported sign of my education variable, though it does decrease the size 
of its reported marginal effect. The inclusion of this variable does significantly decrease 
the statistical relevance of the percentage of the population living in urban areas and 
this variable is therefore dropped from my working model at this point. I also test 
measurements of ethnic and religious fractionalization. I do not find either of these 
variables to be statistically significant, a result that mirrors that of both Goldstone et al. 
(2010), and Fearon and Laitin (2003). Lastly I test the addition of the five categories of 
political polity used by Goldstone et al. (2010).  
 Upon reaching a conclusion as to my model parameters I then run tests in order 
to ascertain that the model is statistically sound and properly specified. The first test 
that I conduct is for heteroskedasticity, as the presence of this would violate one of the 
core assumptions made in order to use the statistical techniques that I employ. Using a 
Breusch Pagan test I find that heteroskedasticity is present within my model. This result 
is not surprising as I would expect some variance to be present in the error term due to 
the data having come from over two hundred different nations. In addition to this I also 
test to see if there is heteroskedasticity present within the observations of a given 
nation to ascertain whether or not this variance is only caused by the use of multiple 
nations within the dataset. I do this by conducting the Breusch Pagan test again while 
limiting my observations to that of a single nation. Upon having conducted this test on 
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three different nations I find heteroskedasticity present within two of the three at the 
ten percent significance level. I therefore conclude that heteroskedasticity is present 
within the observation groups of my panel data as well as within the overall data and 
correct for this within my model by using heteroskedasticity robust estimation 
procedures.   
 This study uses panel data, which would normally require the presence of a 
group effect parameter to be included within the model in order to distinguish inherent 
differences from one nation to another. However, because of the nature of my 
dependent variable; that being that it is a binary variable that does not necessarily occur 
in one of the recorded observations within each group, a group effect would not be 
relevant in the way that it would if I were forecasting a dependent variable that takes on 
a range of values. Therefore I conclude that to include a group effect would not be 
appropriate for this model and I do not include one in my finished model. In addition to 
this I later find that the inclusion of a group variable does not increase the predictive 
power of my model when forecasting into the future.  
 The next test that I run is for unit root problems within my data as these can be 
an issue when working with data that contains a time component. My unit root test 




 Another measure that I take is to test for the presence of endogeniety within my 
independent variables. There is some concern that the variable measuring trade may be 
correlated with the amount of natural resources such as mineral deposits found within a 
nation and that this could also be correlated with civil war incidences, as put forth by 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004). To this end I test for the inclusion of not only mineral 
resource rents, but coal rents specifically and total natural resource rents and find that 
none have a statistically significant impact a nation’s chance of revolt. Therefore I have 
no reason to suspect that any of my variables suffer from this problem, but I feel the 
need to further investigate the possibility in order to maintain confidence in the proper 
specification of my model. In order to ascertain that there is no such bias I estimate my 
model, taking into account the results of the specification tests that I have already run, 
and save the residuals. I then run a regression with the saved residuals as the 
dependent variable and using the same independent variables as before. I do this in 
order to find if there is a significant correlation between the error term and any of my 
independent terms, the presence of which would imply endogeniety of the correlated 
independent term within my model. The results of this regression confirm that I do not 
have an issue of endogeniety with any of my right-hand side variables, and I am 
therefore confident in the exogenous variable specification of my model.  
 Having run tests to ensure that my process does not contain any obvious signs of 
bias due to the estimation procedures used, I use the two period lead form of my 
dependent variable in order to forecast into the future. One significant change that I 
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make in order to estimate this model is to the past instability dummy. I modify this 
variable to measure if there is instability present in the current or past two country 
years rather than the past five country years used in the present period version of the 
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In demonstrating the form that the models’ equation takes I have used six 
independent variables as this is the number of independent variables in the final form of 




ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Modeling In-Period 
Table 1 displays the results of my pre-polity variables model using the definition 
of my dependent variable that encapsulates revolt attempts, guerrilla war onsets, and 
state collapses.  
 The first thing to note from the table is that all of the variables are significant 
statistically at the one percent level. In interpreting what these parameters tell us I look 
to the marginal effects rather than the coefficients themselves due to this being 
estimated as a logistic model; as such the actual coefficients do not have a useful 
interpretation. Trade as a percentage of GDP has an average marginal effect of -0.0009, 
which tells us that a one percent increase in trade of GDP will cause the likelihood of 
revolution to decrease by 0.09% on average. This tells us that although this variable is 
very significant, its actual effect on the probable outcome is relatively small in most 
cases. With a slightly higher marginal effect of 0.0013 the infant mortality rate is only 
slightly more influential; in most cases the average effect is a 0.13% increase in the 
probability of revolt due to an increase in the infant mortality rate. As a result of the 
coefficient of conditional GPD growth being negative, in order to interpret its effect we 
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must bear in mind that the value for the actual variable will always be either zero or 
negative due to the way that this variable is calculated. This means that in calculating a 
fitted value, we would be multiplying two negatives together to get a positive value. 
What this tells us is that a higher absolute value of conditional GDP growth is associated 
with a higher probability of a revolt occurrence. The average marginal effect for this 
variable is -0.0117. For each additional one percent that GDP growth is negative in a 
given year, a country is 1.17% more likely to undergo a revolt on average. This is the 
largest marginal effect reported on a non-binary or non-ordinal variable, making this the 
third most influential variable in my model.  
 
With an average marginal effect of 0.0060, the average change due to the 
percentage of females in secondary education is 0.6%. As this coefficient is positive, a 
nation will have a higher probability of revolting the higher its percentage of women in 
secondary education, which is not an expected outcome. This tells us that the more of a 
Table 1
Logistic Regression on Occurences of Revolution, Guerrilla War Onset or State Collapse
Independent Variable Coefficient P-Value Marginal Effect
Trade As Percentage of GDP -0.0085 0.006 -0.0009
Infant Mortality Rate 0.0120 0.001 0.0013
Conditional GDP Growth -0.1111 0.000 -0.0117
%Female secondary Education 0.0575 0.000 0.0060
Civil Liberties Index 0.2340 0.000 0.0246
Instability 2.2250 0.000 0.2336
Constant -6.6233 0.000
Observations: 1014 Correctly Classified: 76.63% With .213 Cutoff
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nation’s women are educated the more likely it is to revolt, which is contrary to what I 
expected to be the case. One theory that might explain this finding is that less educated 
populations are easier to control, or that nations with less education have more central 
control and are therefore less susceptible to revolutionary behavior. Another possible 
explanation for this could be that any substantial change in a nation’s growth potential 
due to increased research and development would already be controlled for by 
controlling for the change in a nation’s GDP. I test for this by estimating my model with 
the exclusion of both the conditional GDP growth and trade variables, but in doing so 
find that the sign of my education variable does not change. The other conclusion that I 
find from this result is that this is likely not the ideal variable to use as a measure of 
human capital, which is the motivation for its inclusion within the model. Despite the 
fact that my education variable does not seem to adequately measure the factor that I 
intend to use it to, I choose to leave this variable in my final model. I do this because this 
factor, while not fulfilling its intended purpose in regards to testing theory, still adds 
predictive power to my model and in doing so still supports the primary purpose of this 
study which is to accurately predict the onset of revolutions and similar events. The 
marginal effect of the civil liberties index is 0.0246, which tells us that for every one 
point higher on the index, a nation is an average of 2.46% more likely to revolt. The civil 
liberties index is set on a scale of one to seven so the largest effect that this variable will 
have is around an additional 17.22% chance of a nation revolting. This is in line with my 
22 
 
expectations as a nation with the highest amount of freedom in its civil liberties scores a 
one in the index, with nations who grant the least civil liberties scoring a seven.  
The last variable in this iteration of my model, the indicator of past instability 
with regards to internal conflict within a nation, has a marginal effect of 0.2336. Since 
this is a binary variable this means that countries that have undergone a revolt, guerrilla, 
coup d’état, or state collapse within the previous five years are 23.36% more likely to 
undergo one of these events again in the current year than it otherwise would.  
This model correctly classifies the onset of these events with an accuracy of 
76.63% in sample. In establishing the amount of observations that have been correctly 
classified for the purpose of benchmarking model measurement for comparison to 
other iterations of this model, or to other studies, I have chosen to set the cutoff rate 
for whether the estimated probability signifies the prediction of a revolt or not as the 
point at which the percentage of correctly classified incidences of revolts equals the 
percentage of correctly classified incidence of non-revolts. The default cutoff rate is at 
0.5 at which the model accuracy is reported as 85.01%, but though this is the point 
halfway between zero and one, this value is no less arbitrarily set than any other cutoff 
rate that one could select; this point has nothing to do with how the predicted values 
are actually distributed or more specifically, how the predicted values of the 
observations which actually take on a one value are distributed. The method that I use 
does take this into account in choosing the point that simultaneously maximizes the 
correct prediction of both revolutionary events and non-revolutionary events.  In 
23 
 
addition to doing this to avoid choosing an arbitrary point at which to set the cutoff 
rate, I use this method in adoption of the method that Goldstone et al. (2010) 
implemented in choosing their prediction cutoff point, which will allow for a further 
point of comparison between the results of that study and this one. This means that the 
cutoff point for each iteration of my model may be different, and as such I display the 
cutoff point for each model iteration at the bottom of the corresponding table 
throughout this paper.  
Next I test for the inclusion of the categorical measures of regime polity put forth 
by Goldstone et al. (2010), which consist of five dummy variables measuring countries 
over a spectrum ranging from fully democratic to fully autocratic. They are: fully 
democratic regimes, partially democratic regimes, partially democratic regimes with 
factionalism present, partially autocratic regimes, and fully autocratic regimes. Ruling 
political regimes are assigned to these five categories depending on a combination of 
two factors: competitiveness of political participation, and openness of executive 
recruitment (Goldstone et al., 2010). A detailed explanation of how nations are scored 
on the democratic to autocratic scale and assigned to the five categories using these 
variables can be found in Gladstone et al. (2010), but is beyond the scope of this study. 
Table 2 displays the results of this logistic regression, wherein the variable for fully 




Upon including these variables I find that the only one that is statistically 
significant is partial democracy with the presence of factionalism. This is a very different 
result from that reported by Goldstone et al. (2010), who found that not only were 
these variables highly significant, that they retained their significance with the inclusion 
of a wide range of other variable. There are several possible explanations for this drastic 
difference in findings. This discrepancy could be due to the fact that the dependent 
variable in my study is much less broad in the nature of the events it attempts to predict 
than that used by Goldstone et al. (2010). However, as their study tested the use of 
their model with various forms of dependent variable, one of which only took into 
Table 2
Logistic Regression on Occurences of Revolt, Guerrilla War Onset or State Collapse
With The Addition of Polity Dumies
Independent Variable Coefficient P-Value Marginal Effect
Trade As Percentage of GDP -0.0089 0.006 -0.0009
Infant Mortality Rate 0.0137 0.000 0.0014
Conditional GDP Growth -0.0991 0.000 -0.0102
% Female Secondary Education 0.0555 0.000 0.0057
Civil Liberties Index 0.3029 0.012 0.0311
Instability 2.1033 0.000 0.2161
Partial Democracy 0.3997 0.399 0.0411
Factionalism 0.9856 0.008 0.1013
Partial Autocracy 0.1462 0.704 0.0150
Full Autocracy -0.1421 0.766 -0.0146
Constant -7.0059 0.000
Observations: 1014 Correctly Classified: 76.43% With  .2 Cutoff
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account adverse regime changes, the reason for this is more likely due to the use of a 
case-control method employed by Goldstone et al. (2010) due to the low number of 
incidences of their dependent variable. I have not chosen to adopt this method because 
within my sample, a much greater percentage of my observations contain events of 
interest, even with the exclusion of coups.  
 The largest change from Table 1 in the reported marginal effects of the original 
variables is a decrease of 0.0175 in the instability dummy, which equates to a 1.75% 
lower chance of a country revolting if prior instability is present than reported before. 
The next largest change is an increase of 0.0065 in the civil liberties index, which means 
an average additional 0.65% increase in a countries probability of revolt due to this 
variable. Using hypothesis tests conducted using the standard errors reported by both 
regressions, the marginal effects reported by the two regressions are not statistically 
significantly different from each other. This indicates that the inclusion of the Goldstone 
et al. (2010) measures of political structure do not significantly affect the estimates of 
the other variables within my model. The largest marginal effect reported of the four 
categorical polity measurements is that of factionalism; which is also the only one to 
gain any statistical significance. At 0.1013 this means that a nation found in this 
classification is 10.13% more likely to undergo a revolutionary event.  
 Since not only are the majority of these dummies not significant statistically, but 
also their inclusion does not increase the ability of my model to predict accurate 
outcomes, I choose only to include the factionalism dummy moving forward.   
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I next run the model on two alternate specifications of my dependent variable to 
see how well the model holds up to changes in how narrowly the concept of revolution 
is defined. Table 3 displays a comparison of the regression results using the three 
different versions of my dependent variable moving from most to least restrictively 
defined from left to right.  The standard definition that I use in estimating my model 
results up to this point and throughout the rest of this paper is the center of the three 
sets of estimates.   
 
As I move from my standard dependent variable classification to only studying 
the incidences of revolt attempts, I find that the statistical significance of trade, infant 
Table 3
Logistic Regression Results on Three Versions of Dependent Variable
Most Restricted Form Measures Revolt Attempts
Standard Definition Measures Revolt Attempts, Onset of Guerrilla Uprisings And State Collapse
Least Restricted Form Measures Revolt Attempts, Onset of Guerrilla Uprisings, State Collapse, And Coups
Independent Variable
Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value
Trade As Percentage of GDP -0.0082 0.012 -0.0090 0.004 -0.0080 0.008
Infant Mortality Rate 0.0111 0.002 0.0126 0.000 0.0136 0.000
Conditional GDP Growth -0.0971 0.000 -0.0999 0.000 -0.1049 0.000
%Female Secondary Education 0.0456 0.003 0.0538 0.000 0.0604 0.000
Civil Liberies Index 0.3131 0.000 0.2388 0.000 0.2448 0.000
Instability 2.2518 0.000 2.1156 0.000 2.0381 0.000
Factionalism 1.0396 0.000 0.8706 0.001 0.9160 0.000













Most Restricted Standard Definition Least Restricted
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mortality, and female education decreases. When moving from my standard definition 
to the least restricted definition which also takes into account incidences of coups, trade 
as a percentage of GDP becomes less significant. The factionalism dummy becomes 
slightly more significant with the inclusion of coup d’états in the dependent variable. No 
trend is forthcoming as the definition of my dependent variable becomes increasingly 
less restricted. The reported p-values of conditional GPD growth, the civil liberties index 
and the previous instability dummy do not decrease from 0.000 with the variation of the 
dependent variable specification.  
The other relevant factor to examine when testing the effects of specification of 
the dependent variable of my model is predictive capacity. I find that moving from the 
standard specification to the least restricted form of my dependent variable does not 
change the accuracy of my model. The restriction of my dependent variable to only the 
incidence of revolt attempts increases the prediction capacity of my model by 1.28%. 
The conclusion of this test is that my model performs either as well as or better when 
using alternate forms of my dependent variable, which for practical purposes means 
that the independent variable selection does not need to be altered when using the 
model to predict a different combination of revolution type events.  I do not report the 
marginal effects as they are not needed to ascertain whether or not the model 
estimates have changed significantly, which is the purpose of testing the alternate 
specifications of the dependent variable.  
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Modeling Future Events 
 While I have established that my model is both significant statistically and 
practically in terms of predicting events given information from the year in which they 
occur, this is not necessarily a useful result in and of itself. Correctly predicting the 
occurrence of an event such as a revolution or civil war with less than twelve months to 
take action based on this knowledge may not be ideal to policy makers or others that 
could be affected by these events as a larger timeframe may be necessary in order to 
properly plan and execute contingency plans. The more time policy makers are given to 
react before the predicted event may occur, the more options are available to them. To 
this end I now take my model from an in-year predictive model to a forward looking 
model to predict the occurrence of revolutionary behavior two years into the future.  
 There are several potential methods of doing this, but for simplicity and ease of 
use, I use the method implemented by Goldstone et al. (2010). This method makes the 
dependent variable a two period lead of my original dependent variable, meaning that 
the new dependent variable takes on a one value in a country-year two years prior to 
the actual occurrence of a revolutionary incident. In executing this method I also make a 
change to my instability variable, which takes a one value if there are revolutionary 
incidences recorded in any of the previous five country years. I adapt this variable to 
take on a one value if there is an incidence within the measurement year or the three 
years previous to this. In doing this I make an effort to use the model to predict if a 
country would revolt in this intermediate year and then incorporate this value into the 
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instability dummy. The results of this inclusion however are not useful in increasing 
predictability. Having tested this inclusion using several cutoff rates for the 
determination of a revolt occurring, including 0.108, 0.2, 0.346, 0.4, and 0.5, I find that 
this inclusion decreases model forecasting accuracy by roughly one percent in the best 
of these cases. This value is therefore not incorporated into the instability dummy.  
The alternative approach would be a more mainstream method of forecasting 
future events. This approach would involve the use of a vector auto-regression model in 
order to predict all of the variables within a model into the future in order to come up 
with predicted values of the dependent variable. There are several complications when 
using this method to address this particular issue however; the primary one being the 
use of panel data. The vector auto-regression model is not designed to take into account 
data from different groups, only a single group over a period of time. This means that in 
implementing this method I would have to run a separate regression on each of the 
nations within my study in order to predict the future values of my independent 
variables, and then aggregate these predicted results into panel format. This would also 
require the use of an entirely different model in order to best forecast these 
independent variables. Another possible complication of using a VAR model is the fact 
that the dependent variable is binary. A VAR may not be ideal for the prediction of or 
inclusion of a binary dependent variable; especially within nations where these events 
are relatively rare which could be an issue as each nation must be predicted separately. 
Once the forecasting and aggregation of the independent variables for the primary 
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model are complete, the in-period model as specified prior to this point would then be 
used in order to make predictions of the future values. As with most forward predicting 
models, a problem that could arise due to this method is the compounding of errors. 
Not only must the error within the original model be accounted for but also the error in 
the forecasting of the independent variables.  So for simplicity of implementation I use 
the more straightforward method.  
 
Table 4 displays the results of the model estimated to predict the two periods 
into the future onset of a revolutionary occurrence. In the forward predicting form of 
my model I have excluded the Goldstone et al. (2010) variable measuring democracy in 
the presence of factionalism. I do this for the practicality of the model’s implementation 
rather than for a lack of statistical significance or model predictability. While the 
model’s predictability falls by 0.19% with this exclusion, I find that when attempting to 
Table 4
Logistic Regression on Occurences of Revolt, Guerrilla War Onset or State Collapse
With Two Year Lead
Independent Variable Coefficient P-Value Marginal Effect
Trade As percentage of GDP -0.0068 0.013 -0.0007
Infant Mortality Rate 0.0088 0.010 0.0010
Conditional GDP Growth -0.0492 0.017 -0.0055
%Female secondary Education 0.0470 0.001 0.0052
Civil Liberties Index 0.1721 0.002 0.0191
Instability 1.9613 0.000 0.2177
Constant -5.4953 0.000
Observations: 1014 Correctly classified: 75.25% With .22 Cutoff
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predict out of sample, the number of nations that can be predicted using the model 
increases drastically when information on this variable is not required. I therefore 
believe that this is a practical trade off to make, however the results of the two year 
lead model estimated using the factionalism dummy are reported in Appendix A.  
In comparison to the in-year model as reported in Table 1 the statistical 
significance of all of the right hand side variables with the exception of the instability 
dummy have fallen. This is not surprising as I would expect that in a two year timeframe 
variables such as GDP growth, trade, and the infant mortality rate would fluctuate, and 
they would therefore lose some significance due to this fluctuation. I would expect that 
in most cases the values of the civil liberties index would not change drastically in the 
absence of a revolutionary event, so the fall in significance in this factor is not as 
expected as the others.  
The non-dummy variable with the most change in its reported marginal effect 
from the model as reported in Table 1 is conditional GDP growth with a decrease in 
magnitude of 0.0062 from -0.0117 to -0.0055. This means that not only is this variable is 
less statistically significant when forecasting future values, it has a smaller impact on the 
outcome of the prediction. This is a trend that is followed by all of the variables, with 
the exception of the instability dummy, which while having a smaller marginal effect, 
still retains its level of statistical significance.  
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 When used to forecast future events, the non-binary or ordinal variable with the 
largest average marginal effect is conditional GDP growth, which is 0.0055. This means 
an increase in the magnitude of Conditional GDP growth is an increase in the chance of 
revolt by 0.55%.  The education variable has the next biggest average marginal effect at 
0.0052, which means that a change in this variable causes a change in the chance of 
revolt by just over half of one percent. At -0.0007 and 0.0010, the marginal effects of 
trade as a percentage of GDP and the infant mortality rate are relatively small. The civil 
liberty index has an average marginal effect of 0.0191 meaning that when a country 
moves up on this index by one point it gains 1.91% in its revolt likelihood. The marginal 
effect of the instability dummy is 0.2177, meaning that a country that has undergone an 
incident of political instability in the current year or the past three years is 21.77% more 
likely to revolt in two years’ time than those who have remained stable in recent years.  
 The most important observation regarding this iteration of the model is that the 
percentage of cases of revolutionary activity that are correctly classified does not 
significantly change from that of the in-year form of the model when predicting the 
onset of revolt attempts, guerrilla war beginnings and state collapses. The finding that 
the model does not lose significant predictive power when used to forecast future 
events is extremely important and means that this model can have practical applications 
for political policymakers and the private sector alike. It should be noted though that in 
comparison to the reported results of Goldstone et al. (2010), the other study that 
attempts to predict the occurrence of similar events, this model does not achieve the 
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same success; the aforementioned study reported a success rate of over eighty percent 
when forecasting events with a two year lead time. This means that for forecasting a 
broader scope of instability events the Goldstone model may be ideal for practical 
purposes.  
 The last thing that I do in order to establish the significance and practicality of 
my results is to collect data on a year outside of the range of my dataset in order to test 
the model’s accuracy when forecasting in a year outside of the sample range; the 
inability to accomplish this would drastically decrease the practical value of this model. 
For this year, I choose 2011, which means that the majority of the data I gather in order 
to test my model is from 2009. As discussed earlier it is for this reason that I have 
excluded factionalism from my model. I find that the Polity IV dataset has information 
on substantially less nations than either Freedom House or the World Bank databases 
from which I gather the data on the rest of my independent variables. When testing on 
the 146 nations on which sufficient information is found, this model predicts 137 of 
these correctly when using the 0.22 cutoff rate, used for benchmarking purposes, which 
translates to over 93% accuracy when predicting in the year 2011 for those nations for 
which there is sufficient information available to predict.  
 Having established that my model has the capability to be useful to policy 
makers on a practical level, some note should be made to end users as to how best 
utilize this model in order to yield the most useful results. This model has been found to 
predict the incidence of revolutionary behavior with an accuracy of over 75%, however 
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as there are over 200 different sovereign nations in the world today this still leaves an 
error window of about 46 misclassified countries per year on average when used to 
predict a clear yes or no outcome. What this means for the actual implementation of 
this model is that one should not simply treat its predictions as fact and proceed to 
distance oneself from those nations predicted to fall. A nation that would not revolt on 
its own may be pushed to doing so if its trading partners and political allies where to cut 
ties as a result of policy aimed to minimize collateral damage. This would make the 
outcome of this model in some cases a self-fulfilling prophecy. For distribution and 
reference purposes I set the percentage of type one and type two prediction errors as 
equivalent for this model for the cutoff rate throughout this paper, but because less 
nations tend to revolt than not, this means that most of the prediction errors are those 
that predict a revolt where there will not be one, which emphasizes that to make the 
mistake discussed above would be to risk the onset of many more revolts than are 
necessary. To this end it is recommended that this model should be used rather as a 
way of flagging nations that are at a higher risk of internal political upheaval and should 
be investigated further on a case by case basis. Once this has been done, then 
preemptive action could be taken to minimize adverse spillover effects from a 
revolution or similar event that threatens the existence of the current political system. 
 To this end it may be more practical to break down the fitted values of this 
model into categorical levels of risk, ranging from high to low risk of revolutionary 
incidence. In doing this I organize my 1014 fitted predictions into quintiles, the 
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breakdown of which can be seen on Table 5. When examining the 1014 data points used 
in the estimation of my model I find that my dependent variable takes on a value of one 
in 16.96% of these observations and therefore find it appropriate to label the highest 
twenty percent of the predicted values as high risk.  
 
 I then assign my fitted values for 2011 into these five categories and examine the 
results. Within the 146 countries for which predictions are made, twenty one are in the 
low risk group, fifty five in the medium low risk group, fifty five in the medium risk 
group, ten in medium high risk range, and five classified as high risk. None of the five 
countries classified as being at high risk actually underwent revolts that year, which 
further illustrates the usefulness of breaking the predictions down into risk categories 
rather than cut and dry predictions. I have included six of these predictions in table 6, 
but the entire list of predicted values and risk levels for 2011, including the six found 
here, can be found within Appendix B.  
Table 5
Risk Categorie Description
Low Risk From 0 up to 0.0356
Medium Low Risk From 0.0356 up to 0.0559
Medium Risk From 0.0559 up to 0.1081
Medium High Risk From 0.1081 up to 0.3463




The first of these six, Hungary, is a typical case for a low risk level. Despite having 
a lower than average number for its conditional GDP growth in 2009, which is -6.8, it has 
a very low infant mortality rate, a high trade value, no previous instability, and scores a 
one on the civil liberties index. Yemen is an interesting case in that it is one of four 
nation that revolted in 2011 that were predicted not to, the others being Tunisia, Syria 
and Egypt. My model classifies Yemen as having a medium low risk level which is the 
lowest risk classification of the four nations. In looking at the data from 2009, Yemen 
has no prior instability, no negative GDP growth, and scores a three on the civil liberties 
index. Yemen and all three of the other non-predicted revolts of 2011 were involved in 
the “Arab Spring” uprising movement of late 2010 and 2011.  
 
 The United States also scores within the medium low range of risk for revolt, 
likely due to negative GDP growth in 2009 due to the recession that began in 2008. In 
addition to this the United States reportedly has a low rate of trade in comparison to 
overall GDP in that year. The Syrian Arab Republic, or Syria, scored within the medium 
Table 6
Country Predicted Probability Risk Level Revolt
Hungary 0.0271 Low No
Yemen, Rep. 0.0424 Medium Low Yes
United States 0.0494 Medium Low No
Syrian Arab Republic 0.0803 Medium Yes
Cote d'Ivoire 0.3413 Medium High Yes
Bangladesh 0.4088 High No
Select 2011 Nations With Predicted Risk Levels
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range of revolt risk. Another of the countries associated with the Arab Spring Syria like 
Yemen had no negative GPD growth in 2009 as well as no record of recent instability, it 
did however have a higher score of 6 on the civil liberties index, and a higher value for 
the percentage of secondary education that is female than Yemen. Cote d’Ivoire, 
formerly the Ivory Coast, scores in the medium high risk range and is interesting in that 
it actually did undergo a civil war in 2011. With a relatively high score of five on the civil 
liberties index, a high infant mortality rate, and a recent history of instability this result 
is not surprising. Bangladesh is one of the five nations which scored in the high risk level 
of which none actually underwent revolts. Bangladesh had positive GDP but a history of 
instability, a high civil liberties index score, and above average values for their infant 
mortality rate and female education both of which are associated with higher 





 This study has established several significant findings regarding political 
revolution. In this paper it is shown using empirical evidence that adverse economic 
conditions can be an indicator of political instability in a nation, and it is also shown that 
this result is robust to the inclusion of variables that have been used to study instability 
in the past. In addition a predictive model has been created that predicts not only 
revolution but revolutionary guerrilla war and state collapse with a two year lead time 
with over 75% accuracy when maximizing both the correct prediction of occurrences 
and non-occurrences of revolutionary episodes. It also shows that this model can be a 
good starting point in looking for possible episodes of instability by highlighting high risk 
areas that subsequent efforts can focus upon via the creation of a range of categorical 
risk levels. 
One drawback of this study is that many of the independent variables that I 
would have liked to test were not documented well enough in many nations to glean 
significant results from them. I would have liked to include variables that took into 
account numerous aspects of the ease of doing business within a country, but 
information on these variables was extremely scarce and too recent to be encapsulated 
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within the scope of my dataset. A related shortcoming of this study was the inability to 
find an effective measure of technological growth, normally measured by either the 
amount of R&D development or human capital in a nation. Another drawback is the 
need to collect current data in order to make predictions using this model; in collecting 
data to generate predictions for the year 2011, I am unable to run the model on over 
fifty nations due to a lack of sufficient data, which limits the practical use of the model 
to nations for which sufficient data can be found.  
 In continuing forward in the further study of revolutions and other events that 
disrupt the power structure of a nation there are several possibilities for areas for 
further research. A study involving more influence-able variables such as the ease of 
doing business or number of large or small businesses might yield practical results from 
a policy standpoint. A more in depth analysis of the effects of education and the 
acquisition of human capital as a measure of a nations capacity for economic growth 
through increased research and development may also be a fruitful endeavor once the 
appropriate data is more widely available.  
 With the information that this model provides both policymakers and 
investors alike from nations around the world can be better informed of the risk of 
political upheaval that may present itself in the countries around them or even within 
their own borders. Armed with this information they can then focus their intelligence 
efforts to further define potential risks and take steps to protect themselves from the 












Logistic Regression on Occurences of Revolt, Guerrilla War Onset or State Collapse
With Two Year Lead And Inclusion of Factionalism Variable
Independent Variable Coefficient P-Value Marginal Effect
Trade As percentage of GDP -0.0070 0.010 -0.0008
Infant Mortality Rate 0.0093 0.007 0.0005
Conditional GDP Growth -0.0402 0.065 -0.0058
%Female secondary Education 0.0445 0.002 0.0052
Civil Liberties Index 0.1743 0.003 0.0172
Instability 1.8718 0.000 -0.0011
Factionalism 0.6391 0.023 0.2146
Constant -5.4197 0.000





Country Name fitted Risk Level Country Name fitted Risk Level
Afghanistan 0.0463 Medium Low Lebanon 0.0650 Medium
Albania 0.0440 Medium Low Lesotho 0.0607 Medium
Algeria 0.0861 Medium Liberia 0.0556 Medium Low
Angola 0.0983 Medium Lithuania 0.0512 Medium Low
Antigua and Barbuda 0.0606 Medium Macedonia, FYR 0.0400 Medium Low
Argentina 0.0588 Medium Madagascar 0.0694 Medium
Armenia 0.1128 Medium High Malawi 0.0741 Medium
Australia 0.0375 Medium Low Malaysia 0.0331 Low
Austria 0.0327 Low Maldives 0.0397 Medium Low
Azerbaijan 0.0724 Medium Malta 0.0195 Low
Bahamas, The 0.0391 Medium Low Mauritania 0.3507 High
Bahrain 0.0462 Medium Low Mauritius 0.0357 Medium Low
Bangladesh 0.4088 High Mexico 0.0717 Medium
Barbados 0.0321 Low Moldova 0.0604 Medium
Belarus 0.0543 Medium Low Mongolia 0.0422 Medium Low
Belgium 0.0240 Low Montenegro 0.0506 Medium Low
Belize 0.0567 Medium Morocco 0.0555 Medium Low
Bhutan 0.0671 Medium Mozambique 0.0668 Medium
Bolivia 0.0591 Medium Namibia 0.0454 Medium Low
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.0494 Medium Low Nepal 0.3489 High
Botswana 0.0584 Medium Netherlands 0.0263 Low
Brazil 0.0614 Medium New Zealand 0.0360 Medium Low
Brunei Darussalam 0.0517 Medium Low Norway 0.0372 Medium Low
Bulgaria 0.0449 Medium Low Oman 0.0503 Medium Low
Burundi 0.1068 Medium Pakistan 0.0915 Medium
Cambodia 0.0561 Medium Panama 0.0278 Low
Cameroon 0.1328 Medium High Paraguay 0.0507 Medium Low
Cape Verde 0.0360 Medium Low Peru 0.0548 Medium Low
Central African Republic 0.1016 Medium Philippines 0.0554 Medium Low
Chad 0.2802 Medium High Poland 0.0352 Low
Chile 0.0364 Medium Low Portugal 0.0422 Medium Low
China 0.0810 Medium Qatar 0.0583 Medium
Colombia 0.0769 Medium Romania 0.0630 Medium
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.3735 High Russian Federation 0.1086 Medium High
Congo, Rep. 0.0558 Medium Low Rwanda 0.1018 Medium
Costa Rica 0.0319 Low Samoa 0.0506 Medium Low
Cote d'Ivoire 0.3413 Medium High Sao Tome and Principe 0.0709 Medium
Croatia 0.0544 Medium Low Saudi Arabia 0.0592 Medium
Table 8 






Complete List of Predicted Risk Levels For Year 2011
Country Name fitted Risk Level Country Name fitted Risk Level
Cuba 0.0980 Medium Senegal 0.0531 Medium Low
Cyprus 0.0330 Low Serbia 0.0449 Medium Low
Czech Republic 0.0315 Low Seychelles 0.0174 Low
Denmark 0.0383 Medium Low Singapore 0.0053 Low
Dominica 0.0306 Low Slovak Republic 0.0270 Low
Dominican Republic 0.0546 Medium Low Slovenia 0.0387 Medium Low
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.0737 Medium South Africa 0.0654 Medium
El Salvador 0.0575 Medium Spain 0.0437 Medium Low
Eritrea 0.0954 Medium Sri Lanka 0.0681 Medium
Estonia 0.0489 Medium Low St. Kitts and Nevis 0.0467 Medium Low
Ethiopia 0.0855 Medium St. Lucia 0.0294 Low
Fiji 0.2794 Medium High St. Vincent, Grenadines 0.0372 Medium Low
Finland 0.0503 Medium Low Sudan 0.1369 Medium High
France 0.0434 Medium Low Swaziland 0.0741 Medium
Gambia, The 0.0813 Medium Sweden 0.0362 Medium Low
Georgia 0.0637 Medium Switzerland 0.0324 Low
Germany 0.0378 Medium Low Syrian Arab Republic 0.0803 Medium
Ghana 0.0477 Medium Low Tajikistan 0.0818 Medium
Grenada 0.0560 Medium Tanzania 0.0557 Medium Low
Guatemala 0.0603 Medium Thailand 0.2665 Medium High
Guinea 0.3515 High Togo 0.0495 Medium Low
Hungary 0.0271 Low Trinidad and Tobago 0.0495 Medium Low
Iceland 0.2233 Medium High Tunisia 0.0658 Medium
Indonesia 0.0646 Medium Turkey 0.0642 Medium
Ireland 0.0230 Low Uganda 0.0550 Medium Low
Israel 0.0391 Medium Low Ukraine 0.1062 Medium
Italy 0.0653 Medium United Arab Emirates 0.0204 Low
Japan 0.0635 Medium United Kingdom 0.0404 Medium Low
Kazakhstan 0.0699 Medium United States 0.0494 Medium Low
Kenya 0.0621 Medium Uruguay 0.1125 Medium High
Korea, Rep. 0.0282 Low Vanuatu 0.0504 Medium Low
Kuwait 0.0619 Medium Venezuela, RB 0.0996 Medium
Kyrgyz Republic 0.0433 Medium Low Vietnam 0.0502 Medium Low
Lao PDR 0.0739 Medium Yemen, Rep. 0.0424 Medium Low
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